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A BRIDGE TO SOMEWHERE: HOW A BOLDER CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
CAN SHAPE CIVIL RICO INTO THE IDEAL FREE MARKET 
SAFEGUARD 
INTRODUCTION 
[Wrongdoers] must themselves suppose that the [wrongs] can be done, and 
done by them: either that they can do it without being found out, or that if they 
are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the 
disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for.1 
On November 9, 2007, Merck & Co. agreed to a blanket settlement of 
thousands of cases brought regarding the potentially life-threatening side 
effects from its drug, Vioxx.2  It came to light that, for years, Merck sales 
teams played down the dangers of Vioxx and went so far as to pressure a Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) official to keep quiet about his concerns 
regarding the drug.3  At the time, Vioxx averaged $2.5 billion in annual sales.4 
Nearly a year later, on June 19, 2008, a month after Bear Stearns’ collapse, 
two former Bear Stearns managers, Matthew Tannin and Ralph Cioffi, became 
the first executives of many to be charged criminally in the wake of the current 
subprime market crisis.5  Following a federal investigation, both men were 
indicted for securities and wire fraud.6  Over three months later, with markets 
plummeting, Christopher Cox, head of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), testified before the Senate banking panel, conceding the 
SEC’s performance in monitoring Bear Stearns was “fundamentally flawed.”7 
Although from widely disparate industries, Merck and Bear Stearns both 
faced allegations of misleading federal regulators and extracting market 
advantage in the process.  The stories of these two corporate giants illustrate 
 
 1. Aristotle, Rhetoric (Friedrich Solmsen ed., W. Rhys Roberts trans.), in THE RHETORICAL 
TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 179, 205 (Patricia Bizzell & 
Bruce Herzberg eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 2. Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, 
at A1. 
 3. Carrie Johnson, Merck Agrees to Blanket Settlement on Vioxx, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 
2007, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR 
2007110900597.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Landon Thomas, Jr., First Risk, Then Charges, HOUSTON CHRON., June 20, 2008, at 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2008, at A1. 
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the vulnerability and inefficacy of regulatory agencies.  Merck’s settlement 
was the result of thousands of private claims for damages caused by its drug.8 
Such private claims provide disincentive for companies willing to deceive 
government regulators.  Yet, the future availability of these claims is far from 
certain.  In a 2008 decision, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court held 
that because the FDA’s pre-market approval process contained federal 
requirements, FDA approval of medical devices preempted state common-law 
claims of negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty against the 
manufacturer of a faulty medical device.10  More recently, in Wyeth v. 
Levine,11 the Court held that the FDA’s approval of the defendant-drug 
manufacturer’s label did not preempt an injured consumer’s failure to warn 
claim.12  The Court focused on the manufacturer’s post-FDA approval duty to 
inform consumers of new risks.13  This means claims based on pre-FDA 
approval actions remain subject to preemption.14  The larger question still 
looms: to what extent the public must rely on regulatory bodies in a post-Wyeth 
landscape. 
What if the same free market forces that led these actors astray could be 
redirected in a way to entice companies to keep industry competitors honest?  
What if businesses had to play by the rules because failing to do so would 
mean giving up market share and filling the coffers of competitors?  Do honest 
businesses have a viable and powerful cause of action against competing 
businesses that attain economic advantage through misleading behavior?  The 
answers to these anticipated questions lie within the Supreme Court decision, 
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.,15 which has the potential to 
transform civil RICO from an unwieldy weapon into a powerful corporate 
instrument for maintaining industry-wide honesty.16 
In Bridge, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a plaintiff raising a 
claim based on mail fraud under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1964 is not required to demonstrate 
reliance on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.17  RICO provides a 
private right of action for treble damages to “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation” of the Act.18  In Bridge, each 
 
 8. Johnson, supra note 3, at D1. 
 9. 553 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 1007. 
 11. 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1193–1201. 
 14. See Longs v. Wyeth, 621 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508–09 (N. D. Ohio 2009). 
 15. 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2145. 
 18. Id. at 2134.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
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year the Cook County, Illinois, Treasurer’s Office auctioned tax liens acquired 
on the property of delinquent taxpayers.19  These liens proved to be smart 
investments, since many property holders would be unable to redeem their 
property, and thus allowed the purchasers of the liens to acquire the property 
and collect significant gains.20  The auction proved so lucrative that the County 
began limiting the number of bidders through its “Single, Simultaneous Bidder 
Rule.”21  The plaintiff, a regular customer at the auction (along with the 
defendant), brought suit under RICO against the defendant alleging the 
defendant company filed false attestations that it was in compliance with the 
County’s rule.22 
The issue decided in Bridge, “whether first-party reliance is an element of 
a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud,”23 exists within the proximate 
cause requirement first established in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corp.,24 and later affirmed in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.25  Since 
Holmes, decided in 1992, the Court has read a proximate cause requirement 
into the language of § 1964.26  At the same time, the Court has continually 
recognized that “[p]roximate cause . . . is a flexible concept that does not lend 
itself to ‘a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.’”27  Despite 
this flexibility, Anza incorporated a “directness” element into the civil RICO 
proximate cause requirement that limits recovery only to the “immediate” 
victims of a predicate act.28  Often, the most immediate victims of consumer 
fraud are injured consumers.  Yet, the effect of legislative and judicial “tort 
reform” efforts have left injured consumers without the ability to seek damages 
from corporate wrongdoers.29  Given the inability of consumers to recover 
damages, corporate wrongdoers are able to take advantage of imperfect 
regulatory oversight in order to gain the market share of its competitors. 
 
 19. Id. at 2135. 
 20. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2135. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2136. 
 23. Id. at 2137. 
 24. 503 U.S. 258, 275–76 (1992). 
 25. 547 U.S. 451, 459–60 (2006). 
 26. See id.  The Holmes Court cites the previous observation that “Congress modeled § 
1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act, which 
reads in relevant part that ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .’”  503 U.S. at 267. 
 27. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2142 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors Cal., Inc. v. Cal. 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983)). 
 28. See Anza, 547 U.S. at 458–59. 
 29. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts 
to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of 
RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 937–38 (1990). 
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This comment proposes the Court address this problem by reshaping its 
proximate cause analysis to recognize the intended victims of corporate fraud: 
honest competitors that have lost market share due to fraud, deception, and 
misrepresentation.  The Court must allow honest corporations, injured by a 
competitor’s wrong, to bring civil RICO claims based on the wrongdoer’s 
intended outcome, as determined using a means–end analysis.  Doing so means 
filling the gap left by individual consumers unable to act as private attorneys 
general.  The following hypothetical may help to illustrate how a corporation 
may invoke civil RICO that will, perhaps, invite the Court to directly address 
this very issue in the future. 
Suppose ABC Corp. and XYZ Corp. are competing pharmaceutical device 
companies. Both are engaged in a fierce competition to begin marketing their 
own versions of an insulin delivery device.  Both companies also began the 
FDA’s pre-market approval process almost simultaneously.  And nearly a year 
later, FDA granted full approval to ABC’s insulin delivery device Apulert and 
to XYZ for its equivalent, Exulert. 
Following the approval of both drugs, advertising became heated.  In fact, 
XYZ produced marketing materials received by physicians that flaunted what 
it claimed were “superior trial results.”  A few weeks later, evidence arose that 
XYZ had withheld information from federal regulators, fabricating a large 
portion of its trials.  A resulting investigation revealed the fabrication began 
five months prior to Exulert’s release. 
Following the evidentiary disclosure, patients who used Exulert began 
complaining of harmful side effects.  These individuals seeking relief through 
the courts were dismayed by the the plaintiffs’ firms hesitance and often 
outright refusal to agree to provide representation.  Prior to refusing, attorneys 
explain that individuals harmed by Exulert are unable to invoke state consumer 
fraud acts.  With these tort reform measures in place, attorneys are reluctant to 
invest the massive resources needed for pursuing individual claims, much less 
bringing mass action of individual claims. 
Moreover, although FDA representatives promise closer scrutiny, the 
public is wary to rely yet again on a regulation process that allowed Exulert 
onto the market.  So, what prevents corporate actors like XYZ from cutting 
corners in the future?  More immediately, how helpful is the causal analysis 
from Holmes, Anza, and Bridge?  Who, if anyone, is in the best position to 
right the wrong caused by XYZ? 
This Comment explores the future benefits Bridge may provide to 
corporations and society at large.  This exploration will begin with a brief 
introduction to the legislative inception and judicial expansion and contraction 
of RICO.  While doing so, the comment will lay out the causal analysis set out 
in Holmes and affirmed in Anza.  Next, the Comment will discuss Justice 
Thomas’ causation analysis, which, while excising reliance as an element, 
leaves room for further helpful direction involving future invocations of RICO 
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in civil actions.  Finally, the Comment examines the significance of the Court’s 
decision amidst political pressure to remove RICO as a tool for civil litigators.  
The Court’s adoption of proximate causation suggests civil RICO can be 
tailored in a way that creates a powerful instrument for businesses injured by 
third party misrepresentations and that will keep businesses honest and 
compensate business for damages caused by deceptive, fraudulent, and 
dishonest competitors. 
I.  THE RISE OF CIVIL RICO 
A. Congress’ Fix-all Answer to the Economic Effects of Organized Crime 
RICO first appeared within Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act 
(OCCA) of 1970.30  In 1969, Congress sought to combat “a new threat to the 
American economic system.”31  At the time, organized crime exerted corrupt 
influence over abundant legitimate businesses and labor unions.32  RICO grew 
out of Congress’ search for a satisfactory remedy to remove the corrupt 
influence from these legitimate business practices.33  Congress’ attack would 
expand beyond individual wrongdoers into “new approaches that will deal not 
only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those 
individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the 
nation.”34  The Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized: “[A]n attack must be 
made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place 
on all available fronts.”35 
The Senate bill, at its inception, “limited civil remedies to injunctive 
actions brought by the United States, but the House added a treble-damages 
remedy modeled on section 4 of the Clayton Act.”36  Ultimately, Congress 
passed the RICO statute containing a civil cause of action: “Any person injured 
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this 
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and 
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, 
 
 30. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970); see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A 
DEFINITIVE GUIDE 2–5 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the statutory history and subsequent case law of 
civil RICO). 
 31. G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. 
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 256–57 (1982). 
 32. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76–78 (1969). 
 33. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 29, at 249. 
 34. FRANK J. MARINE & PATRICE M. MULKERN, CIVIL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968: A 
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS at, 17 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/civrico.pdf. 
 35. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 79 (1969). 
 36. JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 2. 
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including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”37  In passing RICO, Congress provided 
a broad remedy that had enormous implications. 
Congress had reason to shape RICO into a broad and far-reaching tool—
organized crime had infiltrated legitimate businesses, weakening the country’s 
economic system.38  Further, Congress found existing remedies “unnecessarily 
limited in scope and impact.”39  As a result, the OCCA, that created RICO, 
provides that “[t]he provisions of this title [RICO] shall be liberally construed 
to effectuate its remedial purposes.”40  From its inception, RICO’s breadth has 
troubled courts tasked with defining its diffuse boundaries.41  And, because of 
this, Civil RICO has been called “an unusually potent weapon—the litigation 
equivalent of a thermonuclear device.”42 
The elements of § 1962(c) contemplate an array of corporate activity 
involved either directly or indirectly with “a pattern of racketeering.”43  The 
expansiveness of the criminal action further evinces Congress’s desire to create 
RICO as an extensive and far-reaching remedy.44  Stated simply, § 1962(a) 
makes it unlawful for “any person” who has “received any income derived, 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or 
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income . . . [in the] operation of, 
any enterprise.”45 
Civil RICO is broad.  The word person is defined to include “any 
individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in 
property.”46  While this definition has been interpreted to include 
corporations,47 the term “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity.”48  Moreover, “pattern of 
racketeering activity” simply “requires at least two acts of racketeering 
activity.”49  The term “racketeering activity” is equally broad and includes, as 
 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); see also JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 3 (“The eleventh-hour 
addition of a civil remedy not confined to governmental plaintiffs may help to explain the volume 
of issues that the Congress never expected or considered.”). 
 38. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 904(a). 
 41. JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 3 (“There is always a tension between a liberal construction of 
a statute and a tendency to overextend it to accomplish ends that the statute was never designed to 
achieve.”). 
 42. Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). 
 44. Amy Franklin et al., Comment, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 871, 872 (2008). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). 
 46. Id. § 1961(3). 
 47. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (2006). 
 49. Id. § 1961(5). 
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predicate acts, nearly eighty federal criminal acts from Title 18, ranging from 
counterfeiting to murder.50  Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, 
relating to mail fraud and wire fraud respectively, are included as racketeering 
activity.51 
Because of RICO’s characteristic broadness, courts have dubbed it “an 
aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for 
fighting crime.”52  Civil RICO provides a broad avenue for plaintiffs seeking to 
remedy wrongs.  Yet, civil RICO’s breadth also raises considerable challenges.  
First, the breadth of civil RICO is problematic for the pragmatic reason of 
docket pressure and the challenge of creating coherent precedent between the 
circuits.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Bridge could allow civil RICO 
claims to be crafted for criminal violations and will provide judicial unity and 
consistency of the elements of a civil RICO claim, including, most 
importantly, the causation requirement.  Prior to Bridge, the Court in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. addressed the challenge confronted by divisions in 
several circuits that arrived with several different interpretations of what 
Congress intended RICO to accomplish.53 
B. “Calling It What It Is”: Sedima Reaffirms Circuit Courts’ Worst Fears 
Several years into the law’s life, plaintiffs rarely invoked provisions of 
RICO to bring civil claims.54  Beginning around 1978, however, civil RICO 
claims expanded tremendously as plaintiffs began taking advantage of the wide 
scope of RICO.55  These plaintiffs had little trouble drafting RICO claims 
within the statute’s broad language, including its expansive definitions of 
“pattern of racketeering activity”56 and “enterprise.”57  Further sweetening the 
pot, plaintiffs were likely attracted to the possibility of treble damages and 
attorney’s fees.58 
 
 50. See id. § 1961(1). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (citing Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 26–29 (1983)). 
 53. Id. at 485–86. 
 54. Eric Lloyd, Comment, Making Civil RICO “Suave”: Congress Must Act to Ensure 
Consistent Judicial Interpretations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123, 129–30 (2007) (finding courts published only two private civil 
RICO decisions between 1970–1977). 
 55. See Stephen D. Brown & Alan M. Lieberman, Rico Basics: A Primer, 35 VILL. L. REV. 
865, 865 (1990). 
 56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b), 1961(5) (2006). 
 57. Id. §§ 1962(c), 1961(4). 
 58. See id. § 1964(c). 
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Despite the statute’s express command that RICO be “liberally construed,” 
federal courts attempted to limit the scope of civil RICO.59  The Ninth Circuit 
attempted to limit civil RICO to “traditional” organized crime activities,60 
while the Tenth Circuit required plaintiffs to allege defendants’ connection to 
organized crime.61  Citing RICO’s Clayton Act origins, the Second Circuit 
construed civil RICO claims to be limited to activities that arose from 
competitive injury.62 
Facing growing rifts as a result of differing interpretations between the 
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985 in Sedima in response to 
the Second Circuit’s attempt to draw in and limit the scope of civil RICO 
claims.63  The Court characterized the Second Circuit’s command that 
plaintiffs “must seek redress for an injury caused by conduct that RICO was 
designed to deter” as “unhelpfully tautological.”64  First, the Court refused to 
read in a prior conviction requirement, citing, among several reasons, 
Congress’ underlying policy concerns.65  Next, the Court explained, “Private 
attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill 
prosecutorial gaps.”66  The Court also rejected the Second Circuit’s attempt to 
read the “racketeering activity” definition in § 1961(1) to require a 
“racketeering injury.”67  Sedima established that racketeering activity must 
only include the commission of a predicate act.68 
 
 59. Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper 
Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 736 n.2 (1990). 
 60. Id.; see, e.g., Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F.Supp 581, 588 (N.D. Cal. 
1984), aff’d., 805 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that to ensure the statute is not applied 
broader than Congress intended, civil RICO actions should only be allowed where the “associated 
‘enterprise’ is organized solely for criminal purposes”). 
 61. Id.; see, e.g., Plains Res., Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
an added requirement of alleging defendant’s connection to criminal organized conduct is against 
the legislative history and Supreme Court interpretation of the Civil RICO statute).  The 
additional requirement of alleging defendant’s connection to organized crime was a fleeting 
requirement.  See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 59, at 736 n.2. 
 62. Id.; see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F.Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
aff’d sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 
(1985) (stating that it was appropriate to limit the remedy of section 1964 to “the class of 
plaintiffs who have suffered a competitive injury” from defendant’s conduct). 
 63. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1985). 
 64. Id. at 494. 
 65. Id. at 493.  The Court refused to accept the Second Circuit’s policy that “a private treble-
damages action under § 1964(c) can proceed only against a defendant who has already been 
criminally convicted.”  Id. 
 66. Id.  (“This purpose would be largely defeated, and the need for treble damages as an 
incentive to litigate unjustified, if private suits could be maintained only against those already 
brought to justice.”). 
 67. Id. at 494–95. 
 68. Sedima, 474 U.S. at 495. 
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The Court concluded that Section 904(a) of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970 required RICO “to ‘be liberally construed to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.’”69  The Court clearly stated, “The fact that RICO has been 
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.”70  In its holding, the Court 
acknowledged RICO’s evolution into “something quite different from the 
original conception of its enactors.”71  The “extraordinary” applications of civil 
RICO are “the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular, the 
inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and 
the courts to develop a meaningful concept of ‘pattern.’”72  As a result, the 
Court effectively held that a plaintiff bringing a civil RICO claim is not 
required to allege “any injury apart from that suffered on account of the 
predicate acts.”73 
Further, the Court clarified that a RICO “plaintiff only has standing if, and 
can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or 
property by the conduct constituting the violation.”74  While the Court 
acknowledged the struggle of courts to define “racketeering injury,” the Court 
cautioned against circuit courts imposing requirements like the Second 
Circuit’s “racketeering injury” requirement since “‘racketeering activity’ 
consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate act.75  Later 
echoed in Bridge, the Court refused to provide a judicial remedy to what it 
perceived as a legislative problem.76  By rejecting attempts by appellate courts, 
like the Second Circuit, to limit civil RICO standing and leaving the task of 
defining RICO in the hands of Congress, Sedima provided little relief to courts 
facing an expansive diversity of RICO claims.77  Even so, circuit courts had 
little patience for Congress’ inaction.78  Strained from creative invocations of 
civil RICO, circuit courts continued the search for a way to further narrow civil 
RICO standing.79 
 
 69. Id. at 498 (citations omitted). 
 70. Id. (citing Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 
(7th Cir. 1984)). 
 71. Id. at 500. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Lloyd, supra note 54, at 134. 
 74. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. 
 75. Id. at 495. 
 76. Id. at 499; see Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemn. Co., 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2131, 
2145 (2008). 
 77. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496. 
 78. See Barticheck v. Fid. Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36 (3d. Cir. 1987); 
California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 79. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor and Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
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C. Post-Sedima Circuit Court Attempts to Narrow Civil RICO Standing 
While interpreting civil RICO consistently with the Sedima Court’s 
command of liberal construction, appellate courts still took strides to rein in 
civil RICO.80  The first post-Sedima attempts to limit civil RICO standing took 
aim at the injury requirement of a civil RICO claim.  For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit instructed that “‘[a]bsent damages, a RICO claim cannot be 
maintained.’”81  Many other circuit courts defined the restriction and specific 
types of injuries compensable under § 1964(c).  Several post-Sedima circuit 
decisions have attempted to further define circumstances under which civil 
RICO claims can proceed.82 
Among the early appellate courts to act, the Eleventh Circuit in Grogan v. 
Platt83 held that plaintiffs could not recover under civil RICO for “personal 
injuries” and the resulting economic consequences.84  In a complaint brought 
by federal agents and the estates of other agents involved in a shootout with 
criminal suspects, the court was “sympathetic to appellants’ argument that 
permitting recovery in this case would help to deter the kind of activity that 
RICO was designed to prevent.”85  The court, however, focused its inquiry on 
whether the “appellants seek the kind of recovery that RICO was designed to 
afford.”86 
The court read the words “business or property” within § 1964(c) to 
exclude personal injury and wrongful death damages.87  In the court’s view, 
“[T]he ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property’ 
excludes personal injuries, including the pecuniary losses therefrom.”88  
Instead, the court found that “[t]he requirement that the injury be to the 
plaintiff’s business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary 
type of damage.”89 
Other circuits expanded on the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
“business or property” phrase of § 1964(c).  The following year, with Rylewicz 
v. Beaton Services, Ltd., the Seventh Circuit similarly found that “injury to 
business or property” excluded forms of physical, mental, or emotional 
 
 80. See Franklin et al., supra note 44 at 912; see also Lloyd, supra note 54, at 135–38 
(discussing circuit court attempts at limiting civil RICO standing). 
 81. Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 
 82. See, e.g., id.; Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1988); Bast v. Cohen, Dunn & 
Sinclair, PC, 59 F.3d 492, 495 (4th Cir. 1995); Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 644 
(6th Cir. 1986). 
 83. 835 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 84. Id. at 846–47. 
 85. Id. at 848. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 847. 
 88. Grogan, 835 F.2d at 847. 
 89. Id. 
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suffering.90  More recently, in the Diaz v. Gates case, the Ninth Circuit adopted 
the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, explaining, “Without a harm to a specific 
business or property interest . . . there is no injury to business or property 
within the meaning of RICO.”91 
This reading of § 1964(c) left civil RICO less appealing to individual 
plaintiffs seeking compensation for both economic and noneconomic 
damages.92  Further decisions construed the harm “to a specific business or 
property interest” in a way that is increasingly better tailored to the interaction 
between a business and an individual as well as between businesses; for 
example, the Ninth Circuit explained, “To demonstrate injury for RICO 
purposes, plaintiffs must show proof of concrete financial loss, and not mere 
injury to a valuable intangible property interest.”93 
In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., the Ninth Circuit reviewed a case in which 
agricultural workers sued their employers for suppressing the workers’ wages 
by hiring undocumented workers for considerably cheaper pay.94  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the workers satisfied the requirement to allege a sufficient 
injury to a property interest; specifically, the “legal entitlement to business 
relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate statutes.”95  
In contrast with Doe and Grogan, the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the 
agricultural workers “legal entitlement to business relations” exists as a 
property interest is an indication of the court’s willingness to adhere to RICO’s 
liberal construction clause.96 
The various interpretations of RICO definitions indicate the discord that 
exists between the circuits.  To provide direction, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits on the issue of 
causation.97  In focusing its analysis on the separation between direct and 
indirect victims, Bridge affirms the role of causation as a vital factor used by 
courts to determine the permissive scope of civil RICO claims.98 
 
 90. Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989).  Also, with Doe 
v. Roe, the Seventh Circuit expounded finding the terms “business or property” to be words of 
limitation that preclude recovery for “personal injuries and pecuniary losses included thereform.”  
958 F.2d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 91. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 92. See JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 30. 
 93. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 94. 301 F.3d 1163, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 95. Id. at 1168 n.4. 
 96. See Lloyd, supra note 54, at 149–50. 
 97. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 264–65 (1992). 
 98. Benjamin M. Daniels, Note, Proximately Anza: Corporate Looting, Unfair Competition, 
and the New Limits of Civil RICO, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 611, 628–29 (2007). 
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II.  REVIEWING THE BLUEPRINTS: THOMAS’ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. Holmes Narrows RICO Causation 
In a decision leading up to Bridge, the Supreme Court in Holmes v. 
Securities Investor Protection Corp. held that in order to have standing for a 
civil RICO action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s violation of § 1962 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.99  Proximate cause persists as 
an impediment to plaintiffs bringing more inventive claims.100  The Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) alleged in a § 1962(c) action, among 
other claims, that the defendants’ conspiracy in a stock-manipulation scheme 
inhibited a pair of broker–dealers from meeting obligations to customers that 
ultimately caused the SIPC to reimburse the customers.101 
In setting out its analysis of RICO causation, the Holmes Court first 
acknowledged that the “by reason of” language of § 1964(c), read plainly, 
could be met “simply on showing that the defendant violated § 1962, the 
plaintiff was injured, and the defendant’s violation was a ‘but for’ cause of 
plaintiff’s injury.”102  The Court, however, determined that not all factually 
injured plaintiffs may recover under § 1964(c), because Congress modeled § 
1964(c) on other provisions that had been interpreted to require “a showing 
that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but 
was the proximate cause as well.” 103 
The Court set forth an analysis of RICO causation, surveying its statutory 
history.104  The Court repeated its earlier observation that § 1964(c) was based 
on the civil-action provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act.105  Moreover, the 
Court noted that section 4 was built from earlier language taken from section 7 
of the Sherman Act.106  Section 7 of the Sherman Act incorporates common-
law principles of proximate causation, and section 4 of the Clayton Act 
adopted prior judicial interpretations of section 7.107  Also, section 4 of the 
Clayton Act required showing proximate causation.108  Thus, the Court held, § 
1964(c) also required demonstrating proximate causation.109 
 
 99. Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 987, 1032 (2003). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 262–63. 
 102. Id. at 265–66 (citations omitted). 
 103. Id. at 268. 
 104. Id. at 267–68. 
 105. Id. at 267. 
 106. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267. 
 107. Id. at 267–68. 
 108. Id. at 268. 
 109. Id. 
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The Court also emphasized the flexible nature of proximate cause, 
acknowledging its use to limit the extent of a person’s responsibility for the 
consequences of that person’s actions.110  The Court “use[d] ‘proximate cause’ 
to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for 
the consequences of that person’s own acts.”111  The Court also explained, 
“[A] plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes 
visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand 
at too remote a distance to recover.”112  The Court’s proximate cause 
requirement limited recovery to individuals who suffered direct injury and did 
not extend to individuals whose injury was derivative of another.113 
The Court noted the concept of proximate cause must have flexibility and 
must be compliant with three specific policy concerns.114  The Court applied 
each of the policy concerns to the facts of the case to demonstrate “how these 
reasons apply with equal force to suits under § 1964(c).”115 
At the heart of the Court’s concept of causation was a “demand for some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged.”116  This “direct-relation” brand of proximate causation provided 
courts with more discretion and indicated an unwillingness to forge an 
inflexible causation element within § 1964(c).117  The Court emphasized that 
the directness of relationship between the injury asserted and the conduct 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
 112. Id. at 268–69. 
 113. JOSEPH, supra note 30, at 24 (“A principal constraint on standing is the direct/derivative 
dichotomy.  A plaintiff may sue for injury that directly suffers by reason of a RICO violation.  If, 
however, the injury is mediated through another entity (for example, a corporation, trust, union) 
in which the plaintiff holds an interest, that derivative injury does not suffice to confer standing to 
bring an individual suit absent a particularized injury unique to the plaintiff.  This is a critical 
component of the proximate cause analysis under Holmes.”). 
 114. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70: 
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a 
plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, 
factors.  Second, quite apart from problems of proving factual causation, recognizing 
claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules 
apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the 
violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.  And, finally, the need to grapple 
with these problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious 
conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as 
private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs 
injured more remotely. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 270. 
 116. Id. at 268. 
 117. See id. 
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alleged is a central element of RICO causation.118  Further, the Court 
characterized proximate cause as reflecting “ideas of what justice demands, or 
of what is administratively possible and convenient.”119 
The invocation of Holmes within Bridge indicates the current Court’s 
willingness to acknowledge the “direct-relation” requirement of RICO 
causation.120  The “direct-relation” requirement, however, is merely a synthesis 
of the Court’s proximate cause analysis.  Additionally, while the 
aforementioned policy concerns may guide courts in determining proximate 
causation, the Court has yet to take up the degree to which societal change may 
affect the scope of proximate cause given the concept’s inherent flexibility.  
The degree of elasticity of the “direct-relation” requirement will allow business 
plaintiffs to proceed in an era of “tort reform” and regulatory lapses to recover 
their losses. 
B. Anza’s Direct Relationship Requirement 
In 2006, the Court redrew Holmes’ proximate cause requirement by 
incorporating a new “directness” requirement.  In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply 
Corp., the plaintiff steel supply business brought a § 1964(c) action against a 
competing business that artificially lowered prices by failing to charge taxes to 
customers that paid cash and refused to report those taxes to the state.121  As a 
result, the defendant charged lower prices, purportedly causing the plaintiff 
corporation to suffer a loss of market share.122  In Anza, the Court redefined its 
direct-relation requirement espoused in Holmes by limiting recovery only to 
“immediate” victims of the predicate act.123  In doing so, the Court determined 
the state was the immediate victim since it lost tax revenue, explaining, “The 
cause of [the plaintiff steel supply business’s] asserted harms, however, is a set 
of actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO 
violation (defrauding the state).”124  The Court based its narrowing of § 
 
 118. Id. at 269 (citation omitted). 
 119. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW 
OF TORTS 264 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 120. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 
(2008). 
 121. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453–54 (2006). 
 122. Id. at 455. 
 123. Id. at 460. 
 124. Id. at 458.  The Court further stated: 
The attenuation between the plaintiff’s harms and the claimed RICO violation arises from 
a different source in this case than in Holmes, where the alleged violations were linked to 
the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers’ inability to meet their financial 
obligations.  Nevertheless, the absence of proximate causation is equally clear in both 
cases. 
Id. 
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1964(c) causation principles on Holmes.125  The Court explained, “When a 
court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it 
must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s 
injuries.”126  The Court found the separation between the plaintiff’s harms and 
the claimed RICO violations too attenuated to provide for proximate 
causation.127 
Applying the Holmes principles, the Court first examined its concern with 
the difficulty of ascertaining damages, since the defendant could have lowered 
its prices without acting fraudulently.128  Next, the Court found a 
“discontinuity between the RICO violation and the asserted injury.”129  
Similarly, the plaintiff could have lost market share for reasons outside of the 
defendant’s fraudulent practices.130  Finally, the Court refused to “broaden the 
universe of actionable harms to permit RICO suits by parties who have been 
injured only indirectly.”131  Supporting its determination, the Court deemed 
that “[t]he requirement of a direct causal connection is especially warranted 
where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to 
vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims.”132  Overall, the Court 
underscored its concern with preventing the “intricate, uncertain inquiries” 
articulated within the Holmes principles from persisting and “overrunning 
RICO litigation.”133  The Court would wait until Bridge to address the question 
of whether reliance by the plaintiff is a required element of a RICO claim.134 
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Anza lays the framework for Bridge.135  Justice 
Thomas criticizes the majority for disregarding the Court’s earlier causation 
analysis established in Holmes and for forgoing a careful examination of the 
statutory language altogether.136  For Justice Thomas, there was no way to 
ignore the fact that Congress explicitly characterized § 1962(c) using broad 
language.137 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Anza, 547 U.S. at 461. 
 127. Id. at 459. 
 128. Id. at 458. 
 129. Id. at 459. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460. 
 132. Id. at 469 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp, 503 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1992)). 
 133. Id. at 460. 
 134. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2008) (resolving the 
circuit split as to “whether first-party reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on 
mail fraud”). 
 135. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2008). 
 136. Anza, 547 U.S. at 463 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id.  (“The language of the civil RICO provision, which broadly permits recovery by 
‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation’ of the Act’s substantive 
restriction plainly covers the lawsuit brought by respondent.”). 
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Justice Thomas argues that it was not the State of New York’s injury that 
caused the plaintiff steel company’s damages; rather, it was the defendant steel 
company’s conduct.138  Stated simply, just because New York was directly 
injured, there is no reason that the plaintiff steel company could not also be 
directly injured by the predicate act.139  And Justice Thomas was not convinced 
by the majority’s stated concern with the difficulty of ascertaining damages.140  
Citing common-law principles, Justice Thomas argues: 
[C]ourts have historically found proximate causation for injuries from natural 
causes, if a wrongful act ‘rendered it probable that such an injury will occur;’ 
for injuries where the plaintiff’s reliance is the immediate cause, such as in an 
action for fraud, so long as the reliance was ‘reasonably induced by the prior 
misconduct of the defendant;’ and for injuries where an innocent third party 
intervenes between the tortfeasor and the victim, such that the innocent third 
party is the immediate cause of the injury, so long as the tortfeasor ‘contributed 
so effectually to [the injury] as to be regarded as the efficient or at least 
concurrent and responsible cause.’141 
Justice Thomas praised the Eleventh Circuit for its limitation of RICO 
plaintiffs to those who are the “targets, competitors and intended victims of the 
racketeering enterprise.”142  To further narrow RICO plaintiffs’ standing would 
be to allow future defendants to avoid liability for damages that are not only 
foreseeable, but also the “intended consequences of the defendant’s unlawful 
behavior.”143 
Justice Thomas’ analysis of principles of common law, proximate cause, 
and statutory language in his Anza dissent would later garner approval from 
each Justice of the Supreme Court in its unanimous decision in Bridge.144  Yet 
still unknown is the extent to which societal change may allow for shifts within 
the directness requirement, given its foundation in proximate causation.  For 
example, what if “the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation” are 
unable to “vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims?”145 
 
 138. Id. at 465 (“[R]ather, it was petitioners’ own conduct—namely, their underpayment of 
tax—that permitted them to undercut respondent’s prices and thereby take away its business.”). 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. at 468 (“[T]he means through which the fraudulent scheme was carried out—with 
sales tax charged on noncash sales, but no tax charged on cash sales—renders the damages more 
ascertainable than in the typical case of lost business.”). 
 141. Anza, 547 U.S. at 470 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 142. Id. at 470 (citation omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Bridge, 553 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2139. 
 145. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460. 
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C. Justice Thomas’ Analysis in Bridge 
Like Anza and Holmes before it, Bridge grew out of an intricate, 
multilayered scheme allegedly based in fraud, with the plaintiffs arguing they 
had been wrongfully deprived of their fair share of liens and financial 
benefits.146  In Bridge, unlike Holmes and Anza, there were “no independent 
factors that account for the respondent’s injury, there [was] no risk of 
duplicative recoveries by plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from 
the violation, and no more immediate victim [was] better situated to sue.”147  
The central question became “whether first-party reliance is an element of a 
civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.”148 
Justice Thomas begins his analysis by examining the relevant statutory 
provisions.149  First, Justice Thomas notes that § 1964(c) includes “[a]ny 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 
1962.”150  Moreover, “Section 1962(c) does not use the term ‘fraud’; nor does 
the operative language of § 1961(1)(b), which defines ‘racketeering activity’ to 
include ‘any act which is indictable under . . . section 1341 [relating to mail 
fraud].”151  Mail fraud, as separate from common law fraud principles, was not 
subject to the common law fraud requirement of reliance. 
Justice Thomas characterized the plaintiff’s theory as straightforward.152  
The plaintiffs argued the defendant company developed a scheme to defraud 
when it committed to submitting false attestations of compliance with the 
Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule to Cook County.153  The Court noted, “In the 
furtherance of this scheme, [the defendants] used the mail on numerous 
occasions to send the requisite notices to property owners.”154  As a result of 
this process, the plaintiffs lost the chance to acquire valuable liens.155  Finally, 
the plaintiffs were “injured in their business or property by reason of 
petitioners’ violations of § 1962(c), and RICO’s plain terms give them a 
private right of action for treble damages.”156 
Justice Thomas concedes the plaintiffs could not show they relied on the 
defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations.157  As he acknowledged, “This they 
[could not] do, because the alleged misrepresentations—petitioners’ 
 
 146. Bridge, 553 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2144 (2008). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 2137. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2140. 
 152. Id. at 2138. 
 153. Id. at 2135. 
 154. Id. at 2138. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2138. 
 157. Id. 
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attestations of compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule—were 
made to the County, not respondents.”158  In fact, the plaintiff could not even 
claim it received any misrepresenting materials through the mail.159  Justice 
Thomas further supports his claim, stating, “Nothing on the face of the relevant 
statutory provisions imposes such a requirement [of first party reliance]” that 
explains, “a person can be injured ‘by reason of’ a pattern of mail fraud even if 
he has not relied on any misrepresentations.”160  In doing so, plaintiffs who 
raise civil RICO claims predicated on mail fraud need not show as an element 
of the claim any reliance on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.161 
Justice Thomas cites his Anza dissent, explaining there is “no reason to 
believe that Congress would have defined ‘racketeering activity’ to include 
acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes if it intended fraud-
related acts to be predicate acts under RICO only when those acts would have 
been actionable under the common law.”162  By incorporating his dissent from 
Anza, Justice Thomas underscores the incompatibility of RICO’s formulation 
of causation within mail fraud with that of common law fraud.163  Thomas 
strikes down the defendant’s argument for reading a reliance requirement into 
a RICO claim, stating that “[t]he indictable act under § 1341 is not the 
fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of the mails with the purpose 
of executing or attempting to execute a scheme to defraud.”164  Thomas further 
notes that mail fraud exists outside common law fraud, making common-law 
fraud principles of little consequence.165 
Thomas, however, defines the appropriate proximate cause analysis under 
civil RICO: “When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, 
the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to 
the plaintiff’s injuries.”166  Thomas emphasizes that proximate cause should be 
a flexible principle that is not easily laid down in “black letter rule[s].”167  
Proximate cause, he explains, is used “‘to label generically the judicial tools 
used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2138–39; see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500 (2000) (using 
common law conspiracy as a template to construe RICO conspiracy and providing Justice 
Thomas with precedent for reading a reliance requirement into a 1964(c) conspiracy claim). 
 162. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 477–
78 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 163. See id. at 2142. 
 164. Id. at 2140. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2142. 
 167. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2142 (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp, 503 U.S. 258, 272 
n.20 (1992)). 
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own acts,’ with a particular emphasis on the ‘demand for some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged . . . .’”168  Yet, 
first-party reliance is not necessary if there exists a “sufficiently direct 
relationship between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s 
injury.”169 
The Court’s newly crafted definition of causation in civil RICO cases is 
consistent with the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
“provides the example of a defendant who ‘seeks to promote his own interest 
by telling a known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product.’”170  
Moreover, the Restatement also “specifically recognizes ‘a cause of action’ in 
favor of the injured party where the defendant ‘defrauds another for the 
purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third person.’”171  While first party 
reliance is not required in a RICO action, reliance of some party remains a 
necessity.172  This makes sense considering that damages rarely arise unless 
there has been reliance on fraud.173 
In conclusion, Justice Thomas struck out at further judicial attempts at 
limiting the breadth of civil RICO: “It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the 
private action in situations where Congress provided for it.”174  He continues, 
“We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in 
order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended 
to proscribe.”175 
Amidst three divided appellate courts,176 the Supreme Court has, without 
equivocation, recognized that RICO is exactly what it purports to be—a broad, 
powerful, and accessible tool for victims of one or more of the numerous 
predicate acts it identifies.177  Whereas Sedima provided little practical 
direction to appellate courts facing an onslaught of RICO claims, Bridge now 
provides a causal analysis that will help lawyers craft remedies and provide 
courts with uniformity of decision. 
 
 168. Id. at 2142. 
 169. Id. at 2144. 
 170. Id. at 2143 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870, cmt. H (1977)). 
 171. Id. at 2143 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A cmt. A (1965)). 
 172. Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 173. Id. at 2144 (“If, for example, the county had not accepted petitioners’ false attestations of 
compliance with the Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule, and as a result, had not permitted 
petitioners to participate in the auction, respondents’ injury would never have materialized.”). 
 174. Id. at 2145. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499–500 (1985)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696, 699–700 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, 477 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 177. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2145. 
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III.  BEYOND BRIDGE: CIVIL RICO PERSISTS AMIDST AN ATMOSPHERE OF 
TORT REFORM 
The Court’s decision to sustain RICO’s characteristically broad import 
stands in striking contrast to expanding “tort reform” measures.  “After Bridge, 
plaintiffs need not plead or prove that they relied on defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations in order to establish the elements of their civil RICO claim 
based on mail or wire fraud.”178  Bridge now introduces RICO as a new 
remedy that will benefit businesses and consumers alike.  Further, businesses 
now have a more predictable legal landscape, helping to foresee and avoid 
future liabilities and prevent litigation. 
A. Stress-testing: Proximate Causation and the Current Consumer 
Protection Landscape 
Yet, to what extent are plaintiffs constrained by the Holmes “direct-relation 
test?”  As Holmes indicated—and Anza and Bridge affirmed—the “direct-
relation test” is nothing more than the court’s proximate cause analysis.179  
Proximate cause is merely a “judicial [tool] used to limit a person’s 
responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts.”180  Because this 
is the current law, individual businesses must consider the effects of “tort 
reform” measures together with decisions like Riegel when planning their 
future conduct and behavior (i.e., putting the drugs on the market without 
adequate warning). 
To understand the need for reassessing the Holmes factors, the Court must 
assess the civil action landscape of the relevant area of law.  Private civil 
actions are becoming increasingly limited and ineffective at righting consumer 
wrongs.  With the Court asserting constitutional limitations over the 
quantification of punitive damages,181 the ability of individual or class 
plaintiffs to find a remedy from corporate wrongdoing hangs in the balance.  In 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court 
held that an award of $145 million in punitive damages on a one million dollar 
compensatory damage judgment violated due process.182  Further, the court 
suggested that limiting punitive damages to a single digit multiplier (of 
compensatory damages) would sufficiently address a violation of due process 
rights.183 
On the legislative front, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) has 
had the effect of limiting plaintiffs’ remedies by removing state class actions, 
 
 178. Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 179. See supra notes 112–119 and accompanying text. 
 180. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 464 (2006). 
 181. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2003). 
 182. Id. at 429. 
 183. Id. at 425. 
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including large, private consumer fraud actions, to federal courts.184  CAFA 
was passed in response to the multiplicity of class actions in state courts before 
perceived plaintiff-friendly juries.185  The Act contains provisions limiting the 
fees available to attorneys pursuing large class actions that combine small 
individual claims.186  In general, CAFA expands federal diversity jurisdiction 
for class action lawsuits by creating, with certain narrow exceptions, federal 
jurisdiction for class action litigation involving 100 or more class members, an 
amount in controversy of more than $5 million, and minimal diversity where 
any proposed class member is a citizen of a state different from any 
defendant.187 
The Federal Judicial Center conducted a study, The Impact of the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts, that examined the number 
of class action filings and removals in the federal courts from July 1, 2001 
through June 30, 2007.188  The effect of CAFA has been to increase the 
number of class actions filed in the federal courts based on diversity 
jurisdiction.189  CAFA, therefore, appears to be meeting its objective of 
expanding federal diversity jurisdiction for class action lawsuits, thereby 
diverting many class actions away from the state courts with perceived 
plaintiff-friendly juries.190  If the plaintiffs’ bar perceives that class actions are 
less likely to be decided before such courts, then such attorneys will be less 
likely to take on class actions for fear of expending resources on dubious 
claims or claims that are not likely to succeed. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine found that 
manufacturers maintain a duty to update their FDA-approved warning 
labels.191  The future, however, remains uncertain as to whether consumers can 
bring claims based on harms arising from manufacturer claims made during 
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the FDA approval process.192  If the Court finds federal regulatory preemption 
in this and other areas, individuals will lose an avenue to right wrongs caused 
by large companies, including pharmaceutical corporations, caused by 
defective products.  The result will be that consumers will become 
considerably more reliant on federal regulatory bodies for protection, 
notwithstanding their past mistakes, such as those made evident by the Vioxx 
litigation.193 
If “tort-reform” measures continue to curtail the ability of potential 
individual plaintiffs to assert tort claims, then it must follow that corporate 
entities will be left unto themselves to right the wrongs of corporate 
wrongdoers.  While CAFA limitations set hurdles for plaintiffs’ attorneys 
seeking to establish a victim class, a single business entity may now, under 
Bridge, bring an action alone in their place.  And even if the Court extends 
Campbell’s holding, civil RICO will remain a worthwhile instrument because 
it provides for treble damages.194  With legislation and case law inhibiting the 
individual consumer’s ability to right wrongs in the marketplace, and given the 
imperfections of regulatory oversight, the ability of an injured business to 
utilize civil RICO to seek justice against dishonest competitors may serve a 
vital substitute role for consumers and businesses alike. 
Bridge struck down the Second Circuit’s effort to restrict civil RICO 
standing.  Yet, under closer review, Bridge presents a challenging dilemma.  
Justice Thomas’ intricate statutory construction of RICO aside, it is the Court’s 
evaluation and application of Holmes that proves problematic.  In Bridge, the 
Court emphasizes the instruction set out in Holmes “that proximate cause is 
generally not amenable to bright-line rules.”195  Despite doing so, the Bridge 
Court grounds its entire analysis using statutory construction, foregoing an 
opportunity to contextualize the three Holmes factors in order to determine 
civil RICO causation.196  The Court appears to assume the three Holmes factors 
exist in an atmosphere unchanged since 1992, as though ordinary consumers 
are granted the same access to consumer protection as existed seventeen years 
earlier.  In reality, this access has retracted. 
B. The Holmes Factors Applied 
To illustrate, reconsider the hypothetical set out in the beginning of this 
comment.  With Bridge, whether ABC has a viable cause of action against 
XYZ depends on the Court’s analysis of proximate cause, since ABC has met 
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all standing requirements of civil RICO, such as the pattern of XYZ’s 
misrepresentations and the company’s use of the mails to perpetrate the fraud.  
First, while ABC may be able to demonstrate that its loss of market share 
exists but for XYZ’s multiple misrepresentations to the FDA, Holmes, Anza, 
and Bridge have read “by reason of,” the textual representation of RICO 
causation, to incorporate the Court’s proximate causation analysis. 
In applying this analysis, consider the directness of the injury.  Those most 
directly injured by XYZ’s misrepresentations are the patients who utilized 
XYZ’s product.  As Anza warns, the more attenuated the injury, the more 
difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of the plaintiff’s damages 
attributed to the company’s violation.  Assessing damages depends upon the 
ability of ABC—the only other manufacturer of this type of insulin device—to 
calculate the loss of sales it incurred.  Does the fact the individual patients’ 
claims are preempted by FDA premarket approval solve the Court’s problem 
with attenuation?  It would certainly solve any issues with multiple recoveries.  
Most interestingly, preemption has excised the ability of the “directly injured” 
victims to “vindicate the law as private attorneys general.” 
Allowing civil RICO standing in such a case has the potential to produce 
vast societal benefit, since consumers are better protected when companies 
report to regulators with honesty, fearing reprisal from industry competition. 
C. A Proposal 
Both the Sedima and Bridge Courts criticized judicial activism.  Indeed, 
changes to the statutory text of civil RICO lies in the domain of Congress.197  
But the Court cannot shirk its responsibility of interpreting civil RICO in a 
manner that will ensure justice, equality, and equity in application.  Proximate 
causation offers the Court a flexible solution, which will allow more litigants 
access to justice.  Access to justice exists, as Holmes instructs, as an instrument 
“to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own 
acts.”198 
Justice Thomas’ statutory construction provides a thoughtful, nuanced 
interpretation of civil RICO, but the Court has given little attention to its 
underlying purpose.  As stated earlier, Congress’ focus was to provide “new 
approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic 
base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the 
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economic well-being of the Nation.”199  Future decisions must expand to 
include the legislative intent of civil RICO, in order to further refine the 
Holmes factors. 
Considering the first Holmes factor, it is important to recognize that a 
wholesale liberalization of the Court’s “demand for some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” is 
unnecessary.200  This idea, however, should not be given so much weight that 
other factors are hidden from consideration.  Indeed, the Court’s concern with 
directness assists with ascertaining damages.  Without some restriction, the 
degree of attenuation between the fraudulent act and the injured victims will 
provide courts with the unworkable task of compensating the injured and 
preventing multiple recoveries.  Yet, as Benjamin M. Daniels explains in his 
thoughtful examination of proximate causation in Anza, “Mathematical 
difficulties should not interfere with substantive justice.”201  The Court must 
acknowledge the reality that often the direct victims of fraudulent behavior are 
unable to seek damages for the aforementioned reasons, including future 
reform measures and federal regulatory preemption.202 
With “tort reform” measures and federal statutory preemption, consumers 
are left without remedy.  They are left to rely only on the efficacy of 
regulators, despite the failure of regulators to regulate and provide for 
protection.  The predicament leaves consumers, the “directly injured,” unable 
to “be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general.”203  As a 
result, consumers have lost the potentially powerful force of the private 
attorney general as a safeguard for them against the failures of regulatory 
bodies. 
The “directness inquiry” should acknowledge the reality that direct victims 
cannot always be counted upon to vindicate the wrongs committed against 
them.  Instead, the Court must shape its proximate causation analysis in a way 
that takes stock of situations like those presented by the Vioxx example and 
illustrated by the ABC hypothetical.  Given the power of the free market, 
corporations are well situated to fill the void left by the removal of the remedy 
brought by an individual consumer. 
In applying the Holmes factors, courts must acknowledge this predicament.  
Using intent as a guiding factor, injured companies would be allowed to 
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“vindicate the law as private attorneys general” when they are injured in the 
marketplace.204  In doing so, the companies that have fallen victim to corporate 
misconduct—indeed, society as a whole—will benefit from a broader, more 
effective paradigm of jurisprudence that mandates corporate accountability.  
Creating this more effective paradigm does not require expanding causation to 
include indirect victims. 
And yet, consider that a dishonest corporate entity that has misled 
regulators must have intended to appropriate the market share of its 
competitor.  If the effort to mislead regulators serves as the means of the 
dishonest corporation, then the ends sought are weakening its competitor’s 
standing in the market.  Employing a means–end analysis, using intent as a 
guidepost, courts can effectuate justice between the honest corporate actor and 
the dishonest competitor.  By divorcing the Holmes principles from 
surrounding context, Bridge, like Anza before it, employs a causal analysis that 
invites inconsistent outcomes.  Anza viewed the State of New York as the 
direct victim, while viewing the resulting injury to the wronged company as a 
side effect of the fraudulent action.205  Moreover, Justice Thomas’ causal 
analysis from Bridge has the counterintuitive effect of simultaneously 
expanding civil RICO causation by excising a showing of reliance, while 
limiting the prospect of a successful invocation of civil RICO to a very limited 
set of facts.206 
By emphasizing a means–end analysis instead, civil RICO will be 
available to the intended victims of regulatory fraud—the honest competitor.  
Such an analysis extends beyond recognizing just those collaterally injured 
(such as the victims of XYZ’s Exulert), whose access to justice is blocked by 
forces such as federal regulatory preemption.  By adopting this causal analysis, 
compliant corporations are provided an avenue of recourse that extends 
societal benefit beyond the boardroom and to the consumer. 
CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of over thirty-five years of litigation, civil RICO stands on 
the cusp of becoming a remedy for equalizing the economic battlefield.  The 
need for civil RICO will grow as the role of the individual as private attorney 
general dims in an atmosphere of “tort reform.”  More specifically, the effect 
of “tort reform” measures on recovery of punitive damages and Congress’ 
efforts to shrink the prevalence of class actions precludes individuals from 
raising claims that typically would shift the economic losses away from the 
plaintiff on to the businesses that caused the injury.  With Bridge, civil RICO 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 123, 126. 
 206. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 n.7 
(2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
634 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:609 
falls short of filling the void left from the individual consumer.  Harnessing the 
free market, compliant corporations have great incentive to invoke civil RICO 
to remedy the economic effects of competitors who have wrongfully gained 
market share by cutting corners. 
By adopting the free-enterprise system to patrol the marketplace, civil 
RICO will exist as a powerful force to encourage honesty.  In this way, the free 
market incentive to mislead regulators in order to gain a competitive edge will 
be eliminated.  Honest, compliant companies will be able to pursue dishonest 
companies and recover attorney’s fees and threefold economic damages.  The 
Supreme Court, in construing the language of the RICO legislative enactment, 
has provided the potential for a powerful incentive to play by the rules. 
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